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Can buy from Taobao.. Wonder which local authority to approve if someone were to bring in to Singapore, LTA or CAAS? https://www.msn.com/en-xl/travel/other/chinese-flying-taxi-maker-ehang-sells-autonomous-passenger-drone-for-us-332000-on-taobao-as-nation-s-low-altitude-economy-takes-off/ar-BB1k9Kkg Chinese flying taxi maker EHang sells autonomous passenger drone for US$332,000 on Taobao as nation’s low-altitude economy takes off EHang's EH216-S electric vertical take-off and landing vehicle will be available in overseas markets at a suggested price of US$410,000 from April 1 The EH216-S, which was first announced in February 2018, has reportedly completed over 42,000 successful test flights in more than 14 countries Chinese flying taxi maker EHang is selling its EH216-S electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) vehicle on Alibaba Group Holding's Taobao marketplace, weeks before the Nasdaq-listed company makes the autonomous passenger-carrying aircraft available in overseas markets. Based in Guangzhou, capital of southern Guangdong province, EHang has put its EH216-S for sale at a unit price of 2.39 million yuan (US$332,000) on e-commerce giant Alibaba's primary domestic retail platform. Alibaba owns the South China Morning Post. In February, EHang announced that the EH216-S would be sold at a suggested retail price of US$410,000 outside the mainland from April 1. Do you have questions about the biggest topics and trends from around the world? Get the answers with SCMP Knowledge, our new platform of curated content with explainers, FAQs, analyses and infographics brought to you by our award-winning team. The ambitious domestic and international marketing campaigns show EHang's confidence in generating strong market demand, months after its self-developed EH216-S became the world's first recipient of a Type Certificate and Standard Airworthiness Certificate for pilotless eVTOLs. Those certifications were issued last October and December, respectively, by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). "This significant achievement has had a profound impact on our business, as it has sparked a surge in demand for our remarkable EH216-S," EHang founder, chairman and chief executive Hu Huazhi said last Friday, when the company released its latest financial results. "The market response has been overwhelmingly positive, leading to strong quarterly and yearly revenue growth." EHang reported fourth-quarter revenue of 56.6 million yuan, a 260.9 per cent jump from 15.7 million yuan in the same period in 2022, on the back of an increase in orders for its EH216-series products. Total 2023 revenue reached 117.4 million yuan, up 165 per cent from 44.3 million yuan the previous year. Sales and deliveries of the company's EH216-series products totalled 52 units last year, compared with 21 in 2022. Multiple EH216-S aircraft built by EHang are seen parked at a vertiport - an area that supports the landing and take-off of these types of passenger vehicles - in Guangzhou, capital of southern Guangdong province. Photo: Handout© Provided by South China Morning Post After completing aircraft certification, EHang conducted EH216-S production under the supervision of CAAC representatives at the company's factory in Yunfu, a city in Guangdong. The firm began deliveries of certified aircraft to customers in the December quarter. EHang did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The company's shares were up 4.71 per cent to US$16.23 in pre-market trading on Tuesday. The EH216-S, which was first announced in February 2018, has reportedly completed over 42,000 successful test flights in more than 14 countries. The two-passenger aircraft has a top speed of 130-kilometres per hour, a cruising speed of 100km/h and a maximum altitude of 3,000 metres. It has a range of 30km and a flight time of 25 minutes. It is built with 16 propellers, recharges its batteries in 120 minutes and provides a maximum payload of 220 kilograms. The luggage boot can accommodate an 18-inch suitcase to satisfy general commuting and short-distance travel requirements. EHang's EH216-S electric vertical take-off and landing vehicle is seen on display at the 2023 Indonesia International Motor Show held in Jakarta on February 23, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock The autonomous flight capabilities, fully electric propulsion, comprehensive redundancy safety features, and intelligent command-and-control systems of the EH216-S make it an ideal solution for various urban air mobility (UAM) applications, including air taxi services, aerial tourism, airport shuttles and cross-island transport, according to EHang. The company earlier this month forged a UAM cooperation pact with the municipal government of Wuxi, a city in eastern Jiangsu province, covering an order of 100 EH216-S units. Last October, EHang entered into a strategic cooperation deal with the municipal government of Hefei, a city in eastern Anhui province, for joint development of a low-altitude economy ecosystem, with US$100 million in extended support that can be used to facilitate a minimum order of 100 EH216-series products. The low-altitude economy, which is expected to be driven by the wide adoption of aircraft like eVTOLs and pilotless aerial vehicles, was identified as one of the national strategic emerging industries during the Central Economic Work Conference held in Beijing in December. About 20 provinces across the country have prioritised the development of the low-altitude economy this year, according to EHang. That is expected to contribute between 3 trillion yuan and 5 trillion yuan to China's economy by 2025, according to a white paper published last year by the International Digital Economy Academy in Shenzhen. More Articles from SCMP

Expect more China EV brand to hit our shore in the next 2 years, as the big wave have just started. Ultimately, only the fittest will survive on our tiny island (since we have a fixed quota for new car registration each month/year). Another point to ponder: Is PA changing their game plan (betting heavily on Chinese EVs) with the declining market share of Audi? Chinese EV brand Xpeng to be launched in Singapore by second half of 2024 Xpeng, a Chinese electric vehicle (EV) brand backed by German carmaker Volkswagen, will be launched in Singapore by the second half of 2024. Sources with close knowledge of the negotiations said the EV maker appointed Premium Automobiles as its distributor recently. This will be the second Chinese EV brand that Premium is representing, after Zeekr from Geely. The first Xpeng model to retail in Singapore is expected to be the G6, a sport utility vehicle that is about the same size as the Tesla Model Y. This is likely to include a single motor version capable of covering 580km on a single charge. Premium Automobiles did not respond to queries on Xpeng when approached for comment. The dealership, which is also the retail partner of German car brand Audi, would say only that Zeekr remains on track to be launched here by the third quarter of 2024. The Straits Times has also contacted Xpeng for comment. Xpeng’s impending foray into Singapore comes as the EV adoption rate here rises. In 2023, EVs made up 18.1 per cent of total car registrations, up from 11.7 per cent in 2022 and 3.8 per cent in 2021. The Chinese brand is regarded by industry experts as among the strongest contenders against Tesla, although it delivered just 141,600 units in 2023 – a fraction of the 1.08 million units managed by the American EV brand. It sells left-hand drive models in China, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. On March 11, the South China Morning Post reported that Xpeng plans to launch right-hand drive models in the second half of 2024 as part of its global expansion strategy. Volkswagen holds a 5 per cent stake in the company from Guangzhou, China, and the companies are working to develop two VW-branded models for the Chinese market. Automotive consultant Say Kwee Neng said Xpeng is one of three Chinese EV brands – the other two being Nio and Li Auto – that are well regarded for their products’ technology, design and level of sophistication. “There is a lot of hype behind these three brands, but ultimately, it will be down to the representative in Singapore to bring in the right model mix and be relevant. We have already seen how BYD has broken down walls to make Chinese EVs desirable to consumers here,” Mr Say added. Chinese EV brand BYD was the fourth-biggest selling brand in Singapore in 2023, outselling the likes of Nissan (fifth), Hyundai (seventh) and Tesla (ninth). Xpeng joins at least five other Chinese brands that are slated to enter the Singapore market, including GAC Aion, which will be launched in April by Vincar. Their addition will more than double the number of Chinese car brands from the four in 2023 – BYD, MG, Maxus and Ora. Mr Say believes that Chinese EV brands are hastening their move into Singapore to build up global credibility as they try to break into European markets. Automotive analysts expect EV sales in China to grow at a slower pace in 2024, even as domestic EV brands and Tesla have been cutting prices to boost demand. This slowdown in demand is pushing Chinese EV brands to look abroad for sales, some industry insiders believe. The other Chinese EV brands slated to launch here are Smart, which Cycle & Carriage will roll out in the first half of 2024; Chery, which is represented by Vertex Automobile; Seres, which is imported by Hong Seh; and Neta, which Vincar has the rights to distribute.

TIANJIN, China: Singapore and China on Thursday (Dec 7) announced that they will establish a 30-day mutual visa exemption agreement between both countries, amid a post-pandemic improvement in flight connectivity. The proposal was announced during the 19th Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) meeting – the highest-level annual bilateral forum between both countries – held at the Hilton Tianjin Eco-City hotel with a range of agreements set to be signed. This is the first JCBC meeting to be co-chaired by Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang. At the start of the meeting, Mr Ding noted how the number of Chinese students studying in Singapore has exceeded 40,000, basically recovering to pre-pandemic levels. He added that the visa-free arrangement would “provide greater convenience for people-to-people exchanges”. Mr Wong said Singapore hopes to even go beyond pre-pandemic levels in terms of direct flight connectivity. “This will be supported also by a mutual 30-day visa-free arrangement between our two countries, which will enable more people-to-people exchanges, thereby fortifying the bedrock of our bilateral relations," he added. Both sides are working out the operational details, with the aim of implementing the scheme in early 2024, the Singapore Prime Minister's Office said in a media release. Chinese citizens currently require a visa to enter Singapore. Singaporeans holding ordinary passports can enter China without a visa for 15 days if they are travelling for business, sightseeing, visiting relatives and friends, and in transit. China resumed this arrangement in July, more than three years after it was suspended because of the COVID-19 pandemic. This came on the heels of an upgrade in Singapore-China relations to an “All-Round High-Quality Future-Oriented Partnership”, after Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in March during an official visit. The JCBC reviews the substantive collaboration between Singapore and China and charts the direction of cooperation. Mr Wong, who is on a four-day official visit to Beijing and Tianjin, said during a bilateral meeting on Wednesday that he was looking forward to signing more than 20 memoranda of understanding and agreements at the JCBC meeting. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/singapore-china-30-day-mutual-visa-free-arrangement-3971566

Hi Guys , planning to make a short trip to China Qingdao or Yunnan like 5 days 4 night with family . As this is my first trip to China , can you help to advise on the itinery and also any recommendation of private tours , thanks in advance

SEOUL, June 12 (Yonhap) -- A former senior executive of Samsung Electronics Co. has been arrested and indicted for stealing the chip giant's trade secrets to build a copycat chip plant in China, prosecutors said Monday. The 65-year-old former executive, whose name is withheld, was charged with violating the industrial technology protection and unfair competition prevention laws, according to the Suwon District Prosecutors Office. He is accused of attempting to build a complete copy of Samsung's semiconductor factory in China after illegally acquiring the company's confidential data, including chip plant basic engineering data (BED) and process layout and design drawings, from August 2018 to 2019. The prosecution also indicted six other people -- one employee of a Samsung Electronics subcontractor and five employees of a Chinese chipmaker established by the former executive -- without detention on charges of colluding in the alleged technology leak. BED is a technology needed to ensure impurities do not exist in semiconductor manufacturing facilities. Process layout contains information on the floor plan and dimension of a chip plant's eight core processes for semiconductor production. Such trade secrets essential for the manufacturing of sub-30-nano DRAM and NAND flash chips are considered national core technologies. According to prosecutors, the former executive had attempted to use the stolen technologies and data to build a copy of Samsung Electronics chip plant just 1.5 kilometers away from the company's chip plant in Xian, western China. But his plan failed to materialize as a Taiwanese company broke its promise to invest 8 trillion won (US$6.2 billion) in the project, they said. Instead, the former executive reportedly received an investment worth 460 billion won from Chinese investors and produced trial products from a chip manufacturing plant built on the basis of Samsung technology in Chengdu last year. His Chinese chip plant is known to have hired about 200 people from Samsung and SK hynix Inc. He allegedly instructed his employees to obtain and use Samsung's semiconductor design data and other trade secrets and they participated in the crime according to his instructions, prosecutors said, estimating Samsung suffered damage of at least 300 billion won due to the technology leaks. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230612005100315

The ice cream saga sibeh power leh... BMW Mini Ice Cream Is Only For Foreigners, Stock Price Plummeted: The Loss Is Equivalent To 460 Million Ice Creams! At the Shanghai Auto Show, netizens broke the news that the staff at the BMW Mini booth refused to distribute ice cream to Chinese visitors, claiming that it was gone, but then not only gave ice cream to foreigners, but two girls also thoughtfully taught foreigners how to eat it. This kind of differential treatment caused dissatisfaction on the Internet. BMW officials later apologized, but did not quell the anger. This incident was not only fermented in China, but was even reported abroad. As a result, BMW shares fell 3%.The market value has evaporated by 2.16 billion euros, or about 16.3 billion yuan,It can be said that a box of ice cream caused a murder, and the loss was great. Many people have no idea about this loss, so it’s easy to understand if you switch to the Luneurs ice cream presented by BMW. The price of this store is not cheap, and a box costs 30 to 40 yuan.Some netizens calculated that the market value lost by BMW is enough to buy 460 million Luneurs ice cream, not to mention giving away a circle at the auto show, it is enough for BMW to invite 1/3 of the people in the country to eat ice cream. The store also issued a statement before, denying that the staff belonged to their family. “The Luneurs brand did not participate in any on-site operations of BMW’s Mini brand activities during the Shanghai Auto Show. We are only a supplier of ice cream products. The two people who appeared in the video The staff and their specific services are not our responsibility and have nothing to do with this brand.”

I wonder how the finance department approve the budget for such lucky draw prizes. If the winner is a senior management (say CEO, COO, CFO, etc.), the amount is huge enough to full cash a property, but on the other end of the spectrum, if say a production worker, technician, clerk, etc. wins the prize, the payout is barely enough to buy a car (even in China). Me? The amount is still lesser the cost of current cat A COE, how pathetic is my pay.😭 Source: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/employee-at-chinese-company-wins-365-days-of-paid-leave-at-annual-dinner Too good to be true? An employee of an unnamed firm in Shenzhen, China, was the envy of a nation when he won a year’s worth of paid leave at his company’s annual dinner on Sunday. The man, who reportedly holds a managerial position in his firm, was seen in a viral video holding a big cheque with the words “365 days of paid leave” emblazoned on it. An administrative employee at the company, identified as Ms Chen, can be heard in the video explaining that the winner had sought to clarify repeatedly if the prize was real. Even the boss was “stunned” someone had won the prize, she said. The company’s annual dinner had not been held for three years due to the pandemic, according to Chinese media, and a lucky draw was held this time round to provide its employees some relief from work stress. Ms Chen added that the company will discuss with the winner if he would prefer to encash or enjoy his paid leave. Local media reported that the man often travels as part of his job responsibilities. Reports of the large prize have raised envy among Chinese netizens, with some inquiring tongue-in-cheek about vacancies at the company. But the unusual nature of the prize left others discussing its practicality. One commenter on Douyin, TikTok’s sister app in China, said: “Dare he accept the prize? After a year, he might return to find someone else in his role.” It was not the first time a Chinese company has offered a year of paid leave as a lucky draw grand prize. In January 2022, a sales employee from another company, also in Shenzhen, similarly struck the jackpot of 365 days of paid leave. The employee ended up converting a portion of his award into cash and also donated part of it to local charities, Chinese media reported.

Sad to watch this video about the reality young people in China are facing

Many people want her go china to film variety show. But she is not really active nowadays https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/63874273000000001e03f92e

WASHINGTON: China will once again start issuing a range of visas to foreigners as of Wednesday (Mar 15), the country's embassy in Washington said, a major easing of travel restrictions in force since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The move marks the latest step towards reopening China to the outside world, as Beijing gradually breaks with the strict zero-COVID strategy that defined its pandemic response until a few months ago. In addition to new travel documents being reviewed and approved, visas issued before Mar 28, 2020 that are still valid will once again allow entry to China, said the embassy notice posted on Monday, translated by AFP from Chinese. The updated policy will also allow for the resumption of visa-free travel for those arriving in cruise ships to Shanghai, as well as for certain tourist groups from Hong Kong, Macao and countries within the ASEAN regional grouping, the notice said. China received 65.7 million international visitors in 2019, according to data from the UN World Tourism Organization, before the pandemic led the country to seal itself off from the rest of the world. While most other countries began fully reopening their economies and welcoming international travelers earlier, China only began emerging from its strict COVID-19 containment policies in late 2022, after rare demonstrations against President Xi Jinping's signature zero-COVID strategy broke out across the country. Those protests in late November expanded into calls for more political freedoms, with some even calling for Xi to resign, turning into the most widespread opposition to communist rule since the 1989 democracy uprising that the military crushed. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/china-lifts-visa-curbs-foreigners-travel-restrictions-covid-19-3344721

Knn, those tiongs really 不打自招 and 玻璃心。Every thing also find offensive though it’s true. 🤣 Damn gross to see them wear sleeveless then raise their arms. 🤮 🤪 Must ask @Inlinefour S’pore Waxing Chain Seemingly Likens Hairier Women To Orangutans, Ad Offends Chinese Netizens https://mustsharenews.com/waxing-orangutans-strip/?fbclid=IwAR1wGe_F-wIYjD1PKRbnSvHzy5b09zHk6FJZnvDsjWh3zMZhK96Wf64FKbI&mibextid=tejx2t

BEIJING - Chinese scientists have cloned three “super cows” able to produce 18,000 litres of milk per year and over 100,000 litres of milk in their lifetimes, a feat that may help reduce China’s dependency on imported dairy cows. The milk produced is no different from that produced by the clone’s originals, according to an expert involved in the experiment. Once the cloned calves reach two years of age, they can start producing milk for the market, he added. To clone the animals, scientists from the Northwest University of Agricultural and Forestry Science and Technology took somatic cells from the ears of highly productive Dutch Holstein Frisian cattle and placed them in surrogate cows, according to a news release from the university. The technique, known as somatic cell nuclear transfer, was the same used to create Dolly the sheep in 1996, the world’s first cloned mammal. The three calves were born in Lingwu city, Ningxia Hui autonomous region. The first calf was born on Dec 30 via caesarean section. It weighed 56.7kg and shared the same shape and patterning as the cow it was cloned from. After reaching maturity, the clone is expected to produce 18,000 litres of milk per year. In comparison, the average cow in the United States produces about 12,000 litres of milk annually, according to data from the US Department of Agriculture. Mr Jin Yaping, the project’s lead scientist, said that cloning “super cows” would allow China to preserve its best dairy breeds and avoid the biosecurity risk presented by importing live cows from other countries. China currently imports around 70 per cent of its dairy cows. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-scientists-successfully-clone-super-cows

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Automobiles/China-s-BYD-starts-EV-sales-in-Japan-as-it-chases-Tesla?utm_campaign=GL_asia_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20230131190000&seq_num=9&si=44594 China's BYD starts EV sales in Japan as it chases Tesla Elon Musk's company has global lead but affordable option has entered the race BYD, which has made a big name for itself in China, intends to catch up with Tesla in global electric vehicle sales. (Source photos courtesy of BYD and Getty Images) SAYUMI TAKE, Nikkei staff writerJanuary 31, 2023 18:15 JST YOKOHAMA, Japan -- Chinese automaker BYD began selling electric vehicles in Japan on Tuesday as it pursues its global ambitions to overtake more established nameplates. BYD's debut in the world's fourth largest auto market comes with it having secured its place as China's top EV seller and nipping at the heels of American EV giant Tesla in global EV sales. BYD also sells electric vehicles in Australia and Thailand, and has production plants in South America. "We're very excited to be bringing our cars to Japanese customers," said Atsuki Tofukuji, president of BYD Auto Japan, a marketing subsidiary. Tofukuji talked to reporters at BYD's first Japanese sales location, due to open on Thursday in Yokohama, the big port city south of Tokyo. While the Chinese automaker is gaining fame as an EV battery seller, its car sales remain largely dependent on domestic demand. This puts it considerably behind Elon Musk's top-running Tesla, which has penetrated many more global markets. BYD has been eager to close the gap and recently began exporting to India, home to a fledgling EV market, and to Thailand, where it plans its first ASEAN production hub. The Atto 3, which went on sale on Jan. 31 in Japan, has already attracted a "fair amount" of test-drive reservations from prospective buyers. (Photo by Sayumi Take) BYD is entering Japan with a key strength against Tesla, affordability, backed by its roots as a battery maker. The company's flagship Atto 3 midsize SUV, which today went on sale in Japan, goes for 4.4 million yen ($33,800), cheaper than Tesla and Nissan EVs. Government EV subsidies, if they continue, will lower the price. Deliveries are to begin around March. The Yokohama store is also "a good way to present new brands to Japanese customers" as they can actually familiarize themselves with EVs and consult professional dealers about purchases on the spot, Tofukuji said. It is the first of over 20 showrooms that BYD plans to establish across Japan this year. The company aspires to have over 100 dealerships in the country by the end of 2025. This contrasts with Tesla, which largely relies on internet sales. BYD's showroom in Yokohama only has the Atto 3 on display but later this year will exhibit two additional models. Visitors can also take the SUV out for test drives, and the store is already receiving a "fair amount" of reservations. Each BYD dealer in Japan will be equipped with 50-kilowatt quick chargers that can juice up the Atto 3 in about 60 minutes. Japan's EV market has been expanding, though notably slower than other countries. Domestic EV sales in 2022 came to about 59,000 units, a record and almost triple the previous year's total, according to industry groups. They accounted for 1.7% of Japan's passenger car market, surpassing 1% for the first time. But most of the growth is due to vehicles that fall into the kei car category. These microcars are considered to be easy to drive around crowded cities and require relatively low maintenance. And since they need little power, their makers have been able to more easily transition to electric drivetrains. The rest of the industry faces a relatively large obstacle: Many chargers in the country operate on such low power that it takes hours to sufficiently juice up a regular EV. BYD's strategy is to "introduce products that fit each country's charging environment," Tofukuji said, "unlike Tesla, which distributes chargers exclusive to its models." Despite Japan's slowly developing EV market, BYD faces a raft of competitors. Foreign luxury brands like Mercedes-Benz, Tesla and Audi are eager to take big shares of the young market. And although Japan's storied auto industry is filled with EV laggards, those dawdlers are moving to catch up. Toyota recently named a new president and CEO, tasking the relatively young executive with adapting to today's industry trends. "The Japanese EV market overall is getting bigger, and this is a good time to be entering [the competition]," Tofukuji said. "We hope to provide a rich EV life along with the development of Japan's EV environment."

Angry man rams car through the doors of a hotel lobby in Shanghai after arguing with staff about a missing laptop. Please do not try this at home. Your car is expensive, COE is expensive! 😱

Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng Xiaoping as China's leader, died from leukaemia and multiple organ failure. BEIJING: China's former leader Jiang Zemin, who steered the country through a transformational era from the late 1980s and into the new millennium, died on Wednesday (Nov 30) at the age of 96, state news agency Xinhua said. Jiang took power in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown and led the world's most populous nation towards its emergence as a powerhouse on the global stage. "Jiang Zemin passed away due to leukaemia and multiple organ failure in Shanghai at 12.13pm on Nov 30, 2022, at the age of 96, it was announced on Wednesday," Xinhua reported. When Jiang replaced Deng Xiaoping as leader in 1989, China was still in the early stages of economic modernisation. Jiang was president from 1993 to 2003. By the time he retired as president, China was a member of the World Trade Organization, Beijing had secured the 2008 Olympics, and the country was well on its way to superpower status. Analysts say Jiang and his "Shanghai Gang" faction continued to exert influence over communist politics long after he left the top job. He is survived by his wife Wang Yeping and two sons. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/former-china-president-jiang-zemin-dies-age-96-3111731

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Transportation/Indonesia-presents-China-made-high-speed-train-cars?utm_campaign=GL_asia_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20221004123000&seq_num=5&si=44594 Indonesia presents China-made high-speed train cars Railway to connect Jakarta with Bandung; operations to start in June 2023 A total of 12 sets of eight-car trains, approximately 200 meters in length each, will be delivered in the future. KOYA JIBIKI, Nikkei staff writerOctober 3, 2022 21:48 JST JAKARTA -- Indonesia has presented in public the cars of the country's first high-speed train connecting the capital Jakarta with Bandung, a major city in West Java, with commercial operations expected to start in June 2023. The cars, presented to the media on Saturday, were manufactured by a company under China's state-owned train manufacturer CRRC. The covers on the cars were not removed throughout the event. The cars arrived at the port of Tanjung Priok in Jakarta in early September. A total of 12 sets of eight-car trains, approximately 200 meters in length each, will be delivered in the future, including those for inspection According to Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (KCIC), an Indonesia-China joint venture for the high-speed rail project, the cars consist of VIP seats, first- and second-class seats, and a dining car. With a maximum speed of 350 kilometers per hour, the new railway connects Jakarta and Bandung, a distance of about 142 km apart, in as little as 35 minutes, compared to 3.5 hours by the existing railway. There is a plan for Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Chinese President Xi Jinping to take a ride together for a test operation of the new railway in November. Xi is scheduled to attend the Group of Twenty (G-20) Summit in Bali the same month, which Indonesia will chair. Initially, Japan was considered a strong contender to win the order for Indonesia's high-speed railway project. However, Widodo adopted the Chinese proposal on condition that China would not require Indonesia to bear any financial burden. Nevertheless, the completion of the project has been pushed back from the original target of 2018 due to delays in land expropriation and the COVID-19 pandemic. Construction is approximately 90% complete, and the railway is expected to open in June 2023. The total construction cost exceeds the initial estimate of $5.5 billion. In October 2021, the Indonesian government reversed its previous plan and decided to invest government funds. The parliament is scrutinizing the amount of money needed.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Emerging-Asia-growing-faster-than-China-for-1st-time-in-30-years?utm_campaign=GL_asia_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20220921123000&seq_num=2&si=44594 Emerging Asia growing faster than China for 1st time in 30 years Indonesia, Philippines are bright spots but India, Pakistan faltering, says ADB Vegetable vendors at a roadside market in Jakarta on Sept. 12. Indonesia is one emerging Asian economy that is forecast to grow faster than expected this year. © EPA/Jiji CLIFF VENZON, Nikkei staff writerSeptember 21, 2022 09:01 JSTUpdated on September 21, 2022 16:16 JST MANILA -- China's COVID lockdowns mean its economic expansion this year will be slower than the rest of emerging Asia for the first time in more than three decades, the Asian Development Bank projected in a new report. In an updated Asian Development Outlook report published Wednesday, the organization downgraded its forecast for China's 2022 growth to 3.3% from 5.0% in April. The bank also cut its projection for next year to 4.5% from 4.8%. Under its zero-COVID strategy, the region's largest economy imposed lockdowns to fight outbreaks, even as other countries loosened restrictions to reopen their economies. Those lockdowns, the ADB said, add to other economic challenges the region faces. These mainly stem from Russia's drawn-out invasion of Ukraine, which has pushed up global food and fuel inflation and led advanced economies to raise interest rates. Developing Asia as a whole is forecast to grow 4.3% in 2022, down from a 5.2% estimate in April. Excluding China, the region is projected to grow 5.3%, the ADB said. The ADB defines developing (or emerging) Asia as one of its 46 regional members in Asia and the Pacific -- basically all of the region's economies except Japan. For 2023, the emerging Asian region is forecast to grow 4.9%, instead of 5.3%. "Developing Asia continues to recover, but risks loom large," ADB Chief Economist Albert Park said in a statement. "A significant downturn in the world economy would severely undermine demand for the region's exports," Park said. "Stronger-than-expected monetary tightening in advanced economies could lead to financial instability. And growth in [China] faces challenges from recurrent lockdowns and a weak property sector." The ADB projects regional inflation to accelerate to 4.5% this year, from 3.7% in its earlier forecast. Price increases are expected to stabilize at 4.0% next year, but that is still higher than the previous forecast of 3.1%. The bank said rising inflation is expected to dent the recovery of South Asia, which is predicted to grow 6.5% this year, instead of 7.0%. The growth forecast for India, South Asia's largest economy, has been cut to 7.0%, from 7.5%, with a 7.2% expansion predicted next year. The economy of crisis-hit Sri Lanka is expected to shrink 8.8% this year, before the contraction eases to 3.3% in 2023. Pakistan, which grew 6% in its 2022 fiscal year ended June, is predicted to expand at a slower pace of 3.5% in 2023 as International Monetary Fund-backed efforts to fix the country's fiscal deficit curtail economic activity, the ADB said. Still, there are bright spots in other parts of the region. Southeast Asia's growth forecast for this year has been raised to 5.1% from 4.9%, and a 5.0% expansion is projected for 2023. This year's improved forecast comes amid stronger domestic demand in Indonesia, Southeast Asia's largest economy, which is predicted to grow 5.4%, up from 5.0%. The Philippines is now estimated to expand 6.5%, rather than 6.0%.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/The-double-squeeze-on-China-s-sandwich-generation The double squeeze on China's 'sandwich generation' 'Little emperors' grow up to be overburdened caregivers to parents and children Yin Fan is a single mom in her late 30s. When she was pregnant with her daughter, her father living in another city was diagnosed with the nervous system disorder multiple system atrophy and quickly lost his ability to walk. As the family's only child, she had to take care of her baby and her father alone. Yin belongs to China's first generation under the old one-child policy, those born between 1976 and 1985, also known as the "sandwich generation." Now they are trapped with the obligations of caring for their children and aging parents, putting them in financial and emotional binds. China has more than 170 million such sandwich generation families, according to Feng Xiaotian, a demographic sociology professor at Nanjing University. Growing up in the 1980s, they were often called "little emperors" as they got all the attention at home. But now they have become the most burdened generation, said Mu Guangzong, a professor at the Institute of Population Research of Peking University. In the past three decades as this generation grew up to have their own families, China has experienced a profound shift into an aging society with fewer children. From 1990 to 2021, Chinese people's average life expectancy increased from 68.6 years to 78.2. The proportion of people over 65 more than doubled to 13.5% from 5.3%. China's birthrate dropped below 1% in 2020, and the country is expected to enter a period of negative population growth by 2025. With parents living longer and with couples having their own children at an older age, the challenges facing sandwich generation families affect not only their own lives but also have ramifications for the rest of society. A family of three generations in Tianjin on July 6, 2016. Because of high housing costs, many Chinese urbanites cannot afford to bring their aging parents to the city they now call home. Expensive child care China implemented the one-child policy in 1980 to put a brake on population growth and facilitate economic expansion in a planned economy that faced severe shortages of capital, natural resources and consumer goods. The authorities eased the limit in 2016 to allow each family to have two children. Last year, after a new census showed the birthrate had stalled, China raised the cap to three children. Money, time and energy deficits are the most common worries sandwich generation families face. Childbirth, especially of a second child, is often the starting point of such crises. "This is the most stressful time for me," said Liu Li, a 37-year-old employee of a state-owned enterprise. With his wife working at a bank, they take home 20,000 yuan to 30,000 yuan ($2,900 to $4,300) each month, a decent middle-class income in a small town. But since the birth of their second child, they live paycheck to paycheck. In today's China, more and more families with stable jobs and reasonable savings are trapped in financial problems, time crunches or health difficulties due to the burden of raising children, said Zang Qisheng, a professor at Soochow University. The average cost of rearing a child until the age of 18 was 485,000 yuan in China in 2019, which was 6.9 times China's per capita GDP, much higher than in many developed countries including the U.S., France, Germany and Japan, according to a report by the YuWa Population Research Institute. The think tank was established by a group of demographers and economists, including economics professor Liang Jianzhang at Peking University. Child-rearing costs are even higher in large cities, reaching more than 1 million yuan in Shanghai and 969,000 yuan in Beijing. The pressure of raising children is mainly an economic matter, while caring for the elderly is more of a time and energy issue, said Wang Guangzhou, a researcher at the Institute of Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In the next decade, as the parents of the first generation of single-child families enter their 70s and 80s, the elder-care pressure will grow more prominent, he said. People walk by a big housing ad in Nanjing, Jiangsu province, on May 8, 2014. With the trend of late marriage and late childbearing, the double pressure of caring for the elderly while raising young children is more likely to come at the same time. According to the 2019 China General Social Survey, 27% of urban families in China include members who are 60 or older as well as children who are 14 or younger, meaning that one in four families faces this double pressure. Children first As it cares for young children and elderly parents, how will the sandwich generation allocate the family's money, time and human resources? "Children first" was the conclusion in a study based on a telephone survey of 2,439 urban families in the provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shaanxi by Sun Yat-sen University and Guangzhou University. The sandwich generation usually shows a strong sense of responsibility and urgency for its children, said Zhong Xiaohui, a professor at Sun Yat-sen University. However, in terms of elder care, most families lack clear planning and often have to respond on the fly when a parent falls seriously ill. There is a sharp contrast between their rich knowledge of childhood development and their relative ignorance of the elderly, the survey found. Children become the center of families, and parenting styles tend to be intensive or even excessive, said Yang Juhua, a professor of ethnology and sociology at Minzu University of China. As family resources are limited, it is often the elderly who make concessions, Yang said. Not only parents but also grandparents often actively shift resources to the children. To cope with the high costs of child care, the sandwich generation normally needs help from parents. Yang Mo, 61, came to Beijing from her hometown in Anhui province after retirement to help her daughter take care of her newborn. She spends 12 hours a day from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. feeding, bathing and playing with the baby as well as cooking and cleaning before handing the child off to her daughter after work, Yang told Caixin. "I dare not get sick," she said. "Who would take care of the baby?" There were about 42 million infants under the age of 3 in China in 2021, and the nursery enrollment rate was only about 5.5%, according to the National Health Commission. The big gap means most families with infants have to rely on grandparents for child care. Child care costs account for nearly 50% of the average Chinese family's income, and 80% of children under the age of 3 are cared for by grandparents, said Yang Wenzhuang, director of the commission's Department of Population Surveillance and Family Development. As China encourages people to have more children to counter the lowest birthrate since the 1950s, this child care model of relying on grandparents might no longer work. Several studies have found that grandparents are less involved in the care of their second grandchild than the first. More and more elderly people have their own plans for retirement and are not willing to devote themselves to caring for grandchildren, said Yang at Minzu University of China. Even if they want to, aging makes them unable to, the professor said. Without grandparents' help, the burden on the sandwich generation increases, which in turn makes these families unwilling to have more children. In a 2016 survey, 60.7% of mothers who already had one child said they didn't plan to have a second because of a lack of child care. From caregivers to care receivers The more serious challenge is what happens when grandparents are not only unable to help but transition from caregivers to needing care. For the sandwich generation, the worst scenario is that their parents suddenly become severely ill or disabled, physically or mentally. "It's not only expensive but also very stressful on your mind," said Wang at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "It's not like raising a child, with hope growing every day. Once an elderly person can't take care of oneself in daily life, the hope is fading every day." According to an estimate by the World Bank, China is expected to have 93 million people over the age of 75 by 2030, accounting for 6.6% of the population. By then, there will be more than 77 million disabled elderly in China, who will experience 7.44 years of disability on average, estimated Zheng Xiaoying, director of the Institute of Population Studies at Peking University. A nursing home in Jincheng, Shanxi province, on Aug. 17, 2022. Empty nesters Can a single child afford the costs of caring for two elderly parents? According to the 2020 census, 70% of the urban elderly population's income is from pensions and 17.3% from family support. Parents of the first generation of one-child families living in cities thus generally come close to supporting themselves financially, and their children's burden is not obvious, said Wu Haixia, a researcher at the Institute of Population Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. But elderly people living in rural areas are not so lucky. In 2019, the annual pension and other income of the rural elderly was about 3,500 yuan. Most rural elderly people have to rely on family support and continue to work to get by. With the reduction of family size, the proportion of family support the elderly can rely on has been decreasing, said Nie Riming, a researcher at think tank Shanghai Institute of Finance and Law. All the data show that the rural regions are the "disaster areas" in China's aging population challenge. Nearly half the nation's over-65 population live in rural areas, according to the latest census. The trickier question is who will take care of the rural elderly. A 2014 survey by researchers at Renmin University of China found that nearly half of rural elderly were empty nesters, and 12.54% of them needed various degrees of care. The main reason for the high proportion of empty nesters in rural areas is that a large number of young and middle-aged people leave their hometowns to work in cities. When these living-alone elderly become seriously ill, half of them do not seek medical treatment because of mobility problems, being unaccompanied or because they live too far from hospitals -- in addition to financial reasons -- according to a survey by Wu at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Empty nesters in cities face similar difficulties. According to Feng Xiaotian at Nanjing University, the proportion of empty nesters among the parents of first-generation only children in cities was about 60%, based on a 2015 national survey of 12 cities and a 2016 survey of five towns in Hubei Province, If a married couple's parents live in two different cities, that makes it even harder to care for all four parents at the same time, said Nie at Shanghai Institute of Finance and Law. Such cases are particularly common in megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai, where high housing cost is the first problem when children want to bring their parents to live with them, Nie said. Even for those who are able to live with their elderly parents, inadequate care is a common problem. The primary caregivers for 60% of the disabled elderly in urban areas in China are their children, but more than half of them receive care for less than 36 hours a week, according to a 2019 survey by Li Yunhua and Liu Yanan at Wuhan University's School of Politics and Public Administration. Meanwhile, it is difficult for families to find affordable professional care for disabled elderly, Zhong at Sun Yat-sen University and Peng Minggang at Guangzhou University said in a report. China provides few public elderly care services for the average family and few support measures such as subsidies and tax rebates to help families purchase market-oriented care services, they said. "Honestly speaking, it is almost a problem without a solution for the generation of only children to care for their elderly parents," a sociology scholar told Caixin. "This is the sorrow of our generation, and our parents." An elderly paralyzed person in bed at a nursing home in Shaoguan, Guangzhou province, talks to a caregiver in March 2022. Turning old themselves As the public discussion focuses on child and elder care, the needs and risks of those in the sandwich generation themselves are often overlooked. To care for their parents, many people have to quit their jobs or choose a lower-paying job with more flexibility. As a result, they suffer a sharp drop in income and the loneliness of social disconnection, Huang Chenxi, deputy dean of the School of Social Development of East China Normal University, found in interviews with caregivers for disabled and mentally ill elders in Shanghai. Elder care reduces rural women's access to nonfarm jobs by 13.5%, a negative effect that will continue to expand as the intensity of elder care increases, Fan Hongli and Xin Baoying at Shandong University of Finance and Economics found in a study. By the time their parents are in their 80s and 90s, the sandwich generation will be in their 50s and 60s. "When they bury their parents, who can they rely on?" asked Jin Jun, a sociology professor at Tsinghua University. In 2020, China's social insurance fund, which includes the basic state pension funds run by provincial-level governments, reported the first annual deficit on record. The deficit is expected to grow to 11.28 trillion yuan by 2050, when the peak of the retirement of the sandwich generation hits. Scholars have long suggested measures by the government to ease the burden on the sandwich generation. Ma Chunhua, a professor at the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, called for the government to play a more active role in providing child care. "Children should be taken care of jointly by the whole society so they can grow up to take care of the whole society in the future, so as to maintain the overall operation of the economy and the continuity of the social security system," she said at a forum on the aging society. Supportive policies can't be achieved overnight, said Chen Jia, a professor at the School of Sociology of Shanghai University. For example, it took decades for Japanese families to accept a long-term care insurance system and fully reap the benefits of the system, Chen said. At the request of the interviewees, the names of Yin Fan and Yang Mo are pseudonyms.

BEIJING: A major fire broke out in a skyscraper in the central Chinese city of Changsha, state media reported on Friday (Sep 16), adding that the number of casualties was "currently unknown". "Thick smoke is spewing from the site, and several dozen floors are burning ferociously," state broadcaster CCTV reported. "Firefighters have begun work to extinguish the flames and conduct rescues at the scene," it added. The blaze consumed a tall building that housed an office of state-owned telecommunications company China Telecom, the report said. A photograph released by CCTV showed orange flames searing through the building in a built-up area of the city, as black smoke billowed into the sky. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/china-telecom-building-fire-changsha-city-cctv-hunan-2943481 How to put out a fire this huge? Praying for all the first responders and those trapped in the building.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Laos-debt-pressure-raises-specter-of-a-China-vassal-state?utm_campaign=GL_asia_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20220906190000&seq_num=2&si=44594 Laos owes more than half its foreign debt to China, including "hidden obligations," and experts say the Southeast Asian country could end up bartering away land and resources for relief. © Illustration by Hiroko Aida Laos' debt pressure raises specter of a China vassal state Echoes of Sri Lanka on the Mekong as muzzled public seethes over economic woes MARWAAN MACAN-MARKAR, Asia regional correspondentSeptember 6, 2022 06:00 JST NONG KHAI, Thailand -- At gas stations in Nong Khai, a quiet Thai town on the western banks of the Mekong River, streams of vehicles pulling up reveal the troubles across the waterway in Vientiane, the capital of Laos. The drivers with Laotian license plates come with two requests: a full tank, and extra fuel for the 20-liter containers they have on board. Many roll up in high-end SUVs or sleek Mercedes-Benzes, popular among the wealthy few in their impoverished country. "Some of the drivers are regulars, known to us, and they complain about the high price or short supply" of gas back in Laos, said Kiri Malaya, a station attendant, as he filled up a black Range Rover and a blue jerrycan. Kiri has been busier since June. By that month, Laos' gasoline prices were up by 107.1% on the year. But fuel is not the only item on the shopping lists of Laotians who cross the nearby bridge connecting the two countries. An office worker from Vientiane said she comes for household staples like soap, detergent, clothes and even food, since "some are not available in the shops or are now more expensive than before." A baker, struggling with rising costs of ingredients, said, "I have to find new supplies that are cheaper." Living under a communist regime notorious for its oppression and opaqueness, they and other Laotians avoid complaining openly, apart from whispers and rare outbursts of anger on social media. Nong Khai, however, offers a vantage point on their hardships and the risks their China-reliant country faces. Experts have warned the strongmen of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party that there are multiple economic land mines in their midst. The $18 billion economy's depleted foreign reserves and its unsustainable foreign debt -- much of it owed to China for large-scale infrastructure projects like a multibillion-dollar railway -- have prompted some to compare Laos to Sri Lanka. The bankrupt South Asian island ran out of dollars to service its foreign obligations in April, becoming the first country in the region to default in decades. A view of the Mekong river bordering Thailand and Laos is seen from the Thai side at Nong Khai in 2019. The town offers a vantage point on the Laotian economic crisis. © Reuters In Laos, "the macroeconomic situation is very challenging," said Alex Kremer, country manager at the World Bank. The bank warned in May that many in the nation of about 7 million were "at risk of falling into poverty, especially in towns and cities," as prices rise faster than incomes. Overall inflation hit 25.6% in July, according to official statistics. Kremer said that structural weaknesses "have been exacerbated by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, a deteriorating global macroeconomic environment and the rapid depreciation of the Lao kip," the local currency. A year ago, the exchange rate was about 9,400 kip to the dollar. By mid-2022, some exchange outlets in Vientiane were listing rates of about 15,000 kip per dollar. On the black market, the figure was even higher, at about 19,000 kip. The crumbling local currency has prompted Thai analysts to sound the alarm over a severe shortage of foreign reserves in Laos, currently estimated to be roughly $1.3 billion. That is enough to cover only 2.2 months of imports, and will make it a squeeze to service $1.3 billion in foreign debts this year. The country is "suffering from twin deficits -- fiscal deficit and current-account deficit -- amid thin foreign exchange reserves," said Sathit Talaengsataya, a senior economist at Thailand's Krungsri Research. He said that over the past decade, Laos has run fiscal deficits equivalent to 3% to 4% of gross domestic product annually, requiring substantial external financing and resulting in the current-account deficit averaging more than 10% of GDP. Sathit called this a "chronic problem" necessitating an immediate "reset of the economy." Some shaken Laotian leaders have made rare admissions about the country's dire straits. Bounleua Sinxayvoravong, who was appointed central bank governor in June after his predecessor was fired, hinted at the panic in an address to party apparatchiks in the National Assembly. "From the start of 2021 to the first quarter of this year, Laos should have received $9.81 billion, however, only 32% of this entered the banking system of our country," he said, according to local reports. Yet the leadership is coy about how deeply their country is indebted to China, and the potential implications. AidData, a research lab at William & Mary college in the U.S., calculates that Laos racked up $5.57 billion in official debts to China during a borrowing spree from 2000 to 2017. Even that "is only the tip of the iceberg," said Bradley Parks, executive director at AidData. "Laos also has an unusually high level of hidden public debt exposure to China -- an additional $6.69 billion," he said, or about 35% of GDP. AidData defines hidden debts as those contracted by entities wholly or partially owned by the government of Laos but without an explicit sovereign repayment guarantee. Consequently, Laos' total "debt exposure to China is worth approximately $12.2 billion, or 64.8% of GDP," Parks told Nikkei Asia. The World Bank estimated that total public and publicly guaranteed debts stood at 88% of GDP in 2021. But since the World Bank's figure excludes Laos' hidden public debts to China, Parks said, "the country's true level of public debt exposure to all creditors is most likely north of 120% of GDP." "There is no other country in the world with a higher level of public debt exposure to China as a percentage of host country GDP," he added. Not surprisingly, the danger of Laos following Sri Lanka into default has grown, since its annual foreign debt bill averages $1.3 billion until 2025, according to the World Bank. In June, global ratings agency Moody's lowered Laos' credit rating further into junk territory. "Default risk will remain high given very weak governance, a very high debt burden and insufficient coverage of external debt maturities by foreign exchange reserves," Moody's said. This has sparked a diplomatic scramble by Laotian leaders seeking help from China as well as Vietnam and longtime ally Russia, according to seasoned observers familiar with politics in Vientiane. In May, the government invited ambassadors from the three countries for a discussion with relevant agencies and private banks to "resolve the current economic crisis," said Japanese scholar Norihiko Yamada, a Laos specialist who has worked in many government ministries there. "The results and the content of the consultations are not yet known, but it is possible that not only China but also Vietnam and Russia [may get involved] in assisting Laos," he said. Other experts think Laos may benefit from a shift in China's thinking on the debt loads of developing countries. While Beijing has appeared reluctant to restructure Sri Lanka's debt, observers note that it has thrown lifelines to some African countries straining under loan obligations -- largely owed to China for Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects, as in Laos. A high-speed railway linking Vientiane with China's Kunming, launched last December, has contributed to Laos' mountain of debt to China. © Reuters "Interest-free loans, especially to African countries, have been cancelled several times," Mengdi Yue and Christoph Nedopil Wang of the Green Finance and Development Center, a think tank at Shanghai's Fudan University, said in an email exchange with Nikkei. "China has officially expressed its stance on several occasions that it will work with other multilateral and bilateral creditors to tackle debt crises in developing countries." Some argue that countries like Laos -- one of 17 "least developed" countries where China is the single largest bilateral lender, according to the Green Finance and Development Center -- are so enmeshed with Beijing's interests that it has no option but to help. Patrick Mendis, a visiting professor of global affairs at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan and a former U.S. diplomat, said Chinese lending under the "Beijing Consensus" development model is designed on "connectivity" to China's national and security interests. Failing to assist Laos "is not an option for Beijing," Mendis said. Yet any relief efforts are also under wraps. "The Chinese offered $800 million in debt relief to Laos over the past two years, and that gave the Laos government breathing room for external financing pressures," said Jeremy Zook, Hong Kong-based director of sovereign ratings and the lead analyst for Laos at Fitch, the ratings agency. "There are other discussions going on between Laos and China about the nature of future debt relief or debt restructuring to ease the near-term burden, but it is difficult to get an accurate read." The handling of Laos' unpaid debts to China in the past may provide clues -- and hint at a bailout that could turn the Southeast Asian country into an economic vassal state. Previous debt-relief options have ranged from swaps for equity in Laotian state entities to carving out land to pacify Chinese creditors. "There is certainly some historical precedent for bartering land and natural resources to repay foreign debts in Laos or to support domestic infrastructure," said Keith Barney, an academic at the Australian National University in Canberra. Vientiane boasts of such a swap. Laos' government handed over a marsh to build a special economic zone as part of a deal to repay the Chinese, who had built a $100 million National Stadium in time for the 2009 Southeast Asian Games, which Laos hosted. "This is part of the idea of 'turning land into capital,' which was a key development slogan of Laos and implicit policy through the 2000s," Barney said. Laos' government handed over a marsh to build a special economic zone as part of a deal to repay the Chinese, who had built a $100 million National Stadium for the 2009 Southeast Asian Games in Vientiane. © AP But will the Laotian public remain silent spectators if their country is carved up by China, debt by debt? Public sentiment has already turned sour against the one-party, socialist state as the mismanaged economy and dollar crunch make it increasingly difficult to pay for essential imports like fuel and cooking gas. "The word on the street among Laotians in business is that the country is becoming a failed state," a Thai investment consultant who has clients in Vientiane told Nikkei. "Never before has the Laotian public been so angry with the government. ... Its legitimacy to rule is being shredded."

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/Taiwan-report-sounds-alarm-over-China-hybrid-warfare-capabilities?utm_campaign=GL_asia_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20220901123000&seq_num=11&si=44594 Taiwan report sounds alarm over China hybrid warfare capabilities Taipei warns it will counterattack if Chinese forces enter territorial waters or airspace This Taiwanese air base on the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait is on high alert amid China's ongoing provocations. (Photo by Yu Nakamura) YU NAKAMURA, Nikkei staff writerSeptember 1, 2022 00:09 JST TAIPEI -- China plans to use hybrid warfare, including cyberattacks and disinformation along with conventional armed forces, in its efforts to unify Taiwan with the mainland, the Taiwanese defense ministry warns in a new report. The annual report on Chinese military capabilities finds that Beijing is already capable of using electronic warfare to damage Taiwanese infrastructure and cut off some military communications. It also expresses concern over military buildup around the Taiwan Strait and notes that China has been expanding military airfields along the coast within its Eastern Theater Command, which covers Taiwan, and the Southern Theater Command, which includes the South China Sea. The report was submitted Wednesday to the Legislative Yuan. In a news conference that day, the ministry discussed the recent state of so-called gray zone operations by China -- tactics that aim to harm Taiwan without going as far as an armed attack. It confirmed that Chinese drones have repeatedly flown near areas including the Kinmen Islands -- Taiwan-controlled islets near the Chinese mainland. If Chinese military aircraft or ships come within 12 nautical miles of Taiwan, Taipei will "exercise the right of self-defense," said Maj. Gen. Lin Wen-huang, head of planning at the defense ministry. Taiwan fired warning shots Tuesday at Chinese drones flying near the Kinmen Islands -- a first for Taipei in this context. Amid mounting pressure from Beijing, Taiwan's government proposed Aug. 25 a record defense budget of 586.3 billion New Taiwan dollars ($19.3 billion) for 2023, a 13.9% increase from this year.

https://asia.nikkei.com/static/vdata/infographics/china-spends-more-on-controlling-its-1-dot-4bn-people-than-on-defense/ China spends more on controlling its 1.4bn people than on defense Silencing dissent also nips innovation in the bud Aug. 29, 2022 It emerged in the central Chinese province of Henan in June that local authorities had abused an anti-COVID app to contain the movements of more than 1,300 people. Yang, who lives in Shandong Province, is one of them. On the morning of June 13, Yang arrived on a night train at his destination, Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan. As the train approached the station, he could not believe his eyes as his "health code" smartphone app turned red. In China, authorities track the location of citizens. If they are suspected of having come into contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19, their health code apps turn red and they face strict restrictions on their movements. Yang had no recollection of getting close to any infected person. But upon arrival at the station, he got another surprise: Officials told him he must leave Henan, and they took him away. Yang was visiting Henan to withdraw 230,000 yuan ($34,000) from a local bank. In Henan, multiple banks had refused to allow withdrawals since April, sparking a flood of protests by depositors. Local authorities feared that this would be viewed by the central government as a failure if the demonstrations spread. They rushed to cover up the inconvenient truth under the guise of the fight against COVID-19. Demonstrators holds up signs during a protest over the freezing of deposits by some rural-based banks, outside a People's Bank of China building in Zhengzhou, Henan. © Reuters China's zero-COVID policy of containing the virus through strict social controls has sent shock waves around the world. As President Xi Jinping's government pursues its policy of tolerating no infections, local governments across the country are going too far in tightening their stranglehold on ordinary people. On April 14, a video of a scuffle between police and residents of a housing complex protesting against an eviction notice in Shanghai, which was under lockdown, went viral on social media in China. As the residents shouted to police to leave the housing complex, police officers wearing white protective suits moved in en masse to detain them. Screams could be heard. Shanghai was locked down from the end of March, with 25 million residents banned from going out. Some were even forcibly evicted from their homes. Live videos of citizens suffering from food shortages or police behaving violently were posted on social media one after another, leaving authorities scrambling to delete them. A Shanghai sidewalk lies blocked due to discarded cartons believed to have been used for food rations. The street has been impassable since mid-May. © Kyodo But China's leadership under Xi did not waver. In May, it pledged to firmly fight any words and actions that question or reject the country's COVID-control policy and began to further increase its control over the internet. Once a state starts to move strongly in a given direction, it cannot stop easily by itself. According to a U.S.-China joint study published in the journal Nature Medicine, if China eases its zero-COVID policy, it will suffer a devastating blow because the effectiveness of the widely used Chinese-made vaccines is low. The study specifically warned that if China eases the policy, the number of people who show symptoms could rise to 112 million, and 1.6 million people could die in half a year. The Xi government's prestige is at stake. It cannot modify its COVID policy because it cannot let itself depend on vaccines made in Western nations. After taking the helm of the Communist Party as its general secretary in 2012, Xi launched a "zero tolerance" anti-corruption campaign. The move to try to do things perfectly has now spread to everything. The public security bureau of the Shanghai municipal government boasts high achievements. According to the bureau, the arrest rates in 2021 were 96% for burglaries such as sneak thefts and 100% for pickpocketing on subway trains. The bureau installed street cameras in all residential areas and commercial buildings by 2021, expanding the coverage of its surveillance system. The number of robbery cases in 2020 stood at 72, down a whopping 98% from the peak recorded in 2000. It is becoming more likely that the number will decline to zero. Although China is getting close to the ideal of a crime-free society thanks to technology, the price it must pay is by no means small. China's "public safety" spending, which is used to maintain public order and control speech at home, reached $210 billion in 2020. The amount more than doubled in 10 years. China's national defense spending is growing rapidly and closing in on that of the United States. But China's public safety spending was as much as 7% higher than its national defense spending in 2020. That is not all. Pent-up frustration among the public is growing further as the crackdown begins to grow excessive. The village of Wukan in Guangdong Province, once known as "Democracy Village," is now teeming with surveillance cameras. In China, a slang word making fun of police, meaning literally "a falling young man," has trended on social media since late June. It all started when a woman in her 40s and her father got into an argument with a male police officer in Dandong, in northeastern China's Liaoning Province. The woman and her father were stopped by the police officer on their way to a hospital. The officer cited the color of her health code as the reason. An argument broke out between them, and the woman was detained for 10 days on suspicion of obstruction of justice. A mocking video of the police officer, who pretended to have fallen during the confrontation, has gone viral. Public distrust of authorities has deepened due to the zero-COVID policy, and the fruits of people's frustration are being spread on the internet one after another. A vigorous and technologically innovative society can be created only where various opinions are allowed to clash. The more China tries to contain all differing opinions and control everything, the more it will also grow apart from the rest of the world. When the public reaction to this finally comes, "Great China" will find itself diminished. Patriotic reign blowing up in Hong Kong Government squeezes public opinion polls In April, yet another person who has supported Hong Kong's democracy left the city. On a flight bound for the U.K., Chung Kim-wah, a former assistant professor at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, said in a Facebook post, "In the current Hong Kong, there is no room for sincere words, only lies." Chung had been summoned by police three times in connection with the polling organization where he worked, the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute. He wrote on Facebook, "Hong Kong may no longer be a place to live without intimidation." The HKPORI was inaugurated with a research department at the University of Hong Kong as its parent. It has conducted highly reliable surveys that many Hong Kong researchers refer to. But its surveys have also sometimes reflected public opinion that China finds inconvenient. Since the Hong Kong national security law came into effect in the summer of 2020, pro-democracy media outlets, labor unions and other organizations have been forced to disband one after another. The institute is now rumored to be the next target. The Hong Kong newspaper Apple Daily, once a vocal critic of the Chinese Communist Party, has been forced to shut down. © Reuters The HKPORI conducted a survey ahead of the 2021 election for the Legislative Council, Hong Kong's lawmaking body. The survey asked Hong Kong people a multiple-choice question on how they would vote in the election. But the choice of "casting a blank vote" was criticized as "manipulating public opinion and destroying the electoral system." The institute's surveys about the zero-COVID policy and Russia's invasion of Ukraine were also seen as problems. Chinese government-affiliated media concluded that those surveys "lack a scientific basis" and that the institute "is suspected to be colluding with foreign forces." The environment surrounding opinion polls is becoming harsh. According to Tetsuro Kobayashi, an associate professor at City University of Hong Kong, some pollees do not answer political questions honestly, while some researchers refrain from asking sensitive questions. "Basic information such as the support rate for pro-democracy forces has become difficult to see, leading to [Hong Kong's] civil society shrinking," Kobayashi said. When lashing out at the institute, pro-China forces in Hong Kong frequently cite surveys by other organizations such as the Bauhinia Institute and OrangeNews. These surveys show completely different results from the HKPORI's surveys and Hong Kong citizens' actual feelings. For example, a survey by the HKPORI showed that only 32% of people in Hong Kong supported the zero-COVID policy, while as many as 57% were in favor of living with the virus. But a Bauhinia Institute survey said that 68% of people in Hong Kong supported the zero-COVID policy, while only 24% were in favor of living with the virus. It also said that as many as 76% replied that the national security law would not affect freedoms and rights in Hong Kong. Details on the Bauhinia Institute, which was established in 2016 by pro-China forces, are shrouded in mystery. An expert familiar with opinion polls said: "It seems to be conducting surveys using social networking sites popular with those born in China, such as WeChat. As sampling is unbalanced, decent researchers are not taking them seriously." Nikkei asked the Bauhinia Institute about its survey methods and relations with China. It did not answer directly, commenting only that it "serves Hong Kong and the state, unites patriots and supports the implementation of a better one country, two systems [formula] in Hong Kong. On July 1, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Hong Kong for the first time in five years and implored "patriots governing Hong Kong" to be principled. © Reuters Xi recently made a trip to Hong Kong for the first time in five years, timed to coincide with the 25th anniversary on July 1 of the former British colony's return to Chinese rule. In a speech, Xi called for the thorough implementation of the principle of "patriots governing Hong Kong." He regards opinions differing from those of the Chinese leadership as impediments to policy implementation and shows no signs of a letup in the exclusion of pro-democracy forces. A government-affiliated Hong Kong newspaper published the results of a survey showing that as a result of Xi's speech, 77% of local citizens had deepened their confidence in the "one country, two systems" formula. China's propaganda campaign is becoming increasingly fierce. Robert Chung, the HKPORI's president and chief executive officer, pointed out that the question now is how to assess the direction of Hong Kong's society under the banner of science and democracy. Opinion polls are facing a new challenge, he added. If an authoritarian government continues to crack down on opposition forces, only voices supporting it come to be heard, and when the people finally vent their pent-up frustrations, it happens suddenly. This phenomenon is widely known. Hong Kong's "patriotic governance" seems to be incurring great risks as it attacks opinion polls, which are a "social thermometer," and closes its eyes to public opinion.

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https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Road-to-nowhere-China-s-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-at-tipping-point?utm_campaign=GL_asia_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20220810190000&seq_num=2&si=44594 Road to nowhere: China’s Belt and Road Initiative at Tipping Point Pakistan, Sri Lanka debt crises threaten Beijing's regional influence By Adnan Aamir, Marwaan Macan-Markar, Shaun Turton and Cissy Zhou，AUGUST 10, 2022 The drive to Pakistan’s port of Gwadar takes seven and a half hours from Karachi via the Makran coastal highway. Much of the 600-km route is deserted, with no restaurants, restrooms or even fuel stations. On a recent journey, around 200 vehicles in total could be counted during the entire drive. Arriving in the city on Pakistan’s Indian Ocean coast, Chinese and Pakistani flags are ubiquitous, and Chinese-financed construction projects loom, but the city is spookily devoid of economic activity. Near the seafront, broad avenues are curiously empty of vehicles. Inside the city center, the roads are narrow, congested and covered with foul smelling drain water, with few multistory buildings aside from the Chinese-built port compound. It is hard to visualize Gwadar as the launch pad of a new global paradigm, but that is what Beijing would have the world believe. Nine years ago it was plucked out of obscurity -- a backwater in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan region -- and presented as China’s commercial window onto the Indian Ocean, a hub for regional integration under the Belt and Road Initiative, which was to harness the juggernaut of the Chinese economy to the goal of Asian economic development. The BRI is an audacious program of lending, aid and infrastructure contracts totaling over $880 billion, according to the American Enterprise Institute. The initiative, which includes pledges to 149 countries, aims to promote Chinese-led regional integration -- and sew economic dependence on Beijing. First announced in a speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 as the “Silk Road,” the BRI was fleshed out in April 2015 with the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), stretching from Gwadar to the Chinese city of Kashgar, in Xinjiang. The CPEC showcased the China-Pakistan “all-weather friendship” with $46 billion in pledged funds that has since grown to $50 billion. It was to be the backbone of the now renamed Belt and Road Initiative. When the CPEC agreements were signed, Pakistan’s government called Gwadar “the economic future of Pakistan,” an alternative to Dubai that would turn around the country’s economic fortunes. The government also claimed that Gwadar’s gross domestic product would increase from an estimated $430 million in 2017 to $30 billion by 2050, and produce 1.2 million jobs for a population that currently stands at 90,000. But today, with just a couple of months until the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in Beijing, the CPEC is on the verge of crisis, as is the BRI itself. Many headline projects have either failed to get off the ground or produced mixed to poor results. This week, Nikkei Asia begins a three-part series, a comprehensive effort to take stock of the BRI nearly a decade after it began. Today, the project’s initial optimism has been replaced by disappointment over mismanagement, debt crises and corruption that have left many projects unfinished or incapable of fulfilling their promised potential. Nikkei Asia journalists have traveled to focal points of BRI investment over the last decade – from Gwadar to Sihanoukville and Colombo to Kuala Lumpur. Their reporting illustrates the already mature legacy of China’s far-reaching efforts to increase its global influence. Unmet promises The lack of discernible economic activity in Gwadar underlines a tough reality: Nearly eight years after China announced a breathtaking list of development projects in the city -- a new airport, the Gwadar Free Zone, a 300-megawatt coal power plant and a water desalination plant -- none of these have been completed and what investment there has done little to create growth or an economy. Instead, stringent security measures strangle the local fishing industry, which once accounted for 70% of the local economy. The same security measures also sharply curtailed lucrative informal trading with nearby Iran. Despite these security concerns, however, the city continues to import electricity from its neighbor, which regularly shuts down the supply under different pretexts of maintenance. A 300-MW power plant was to be built in Gwadar but so far the work has not started. The power shortage is arguably the biggest stumbling block for any meaningful development there. Adding to this is a chronic water shortage that creates unrest every summer as the government trucks in water for residents. There is a small desalination plant, but it is run only for the benefit of the Chinese workers. Seen through a strategic lens, Gwadar is of seismic importance to China as a window into the Indian Ocean. Western experts have said they believe it could eventually become a Chinese naval base, something both countries heatedly deny. But this top-down logic of the Gwadar project has clearly neglected the bottom -- increasingly dissatisfied locals. The port is derelict owing to power cuts and other shortages. Protests broke out in December over fishing rights, and at least one major Chinese investor has reportedly exited. Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia program at the Wilson Center in Washington, says Gwadar is a victim of outsized expectations. “There was an assumption that new infusions of Chinese capital and technology would magically develop Gwadar into a world-class port, even though previous efforts to achieve similar goals had fallen far short,” he said. Grand strategy When it launched the BRI in 2013, Beijing’s main motivations were domestic, according to Gong Chen, founder of Beijing-based think tank Anbound, who advised the central government about BRI in the early days. Chen told Nikkei that, when the concept was first presented to policymakers, its primary drivers were China's severely aging population, the difficulty of recruiting workers in the Pearl River Delta, China's desire to expand its market scale and an overhang of excess capacity in many economic sectors. But the BRI could not help but be seen as the beginning of a new Chinese-led geopolitical order in Asia, just as the Marshall Plan heralded the arrival of the U.S.-led Atlantic project in Europe. Now it is an open question whether the BRI is a net economic benefit -- or even, in many cases, a liability for its chief recipients. Part of the problem is that, while BRI investment is portrayed as aid, it is most often not. The initiative is intended to make money for Chinese banks and infrastructure companies -- funded mainly by loans and energy supply agreements that in many cases have outrun their recipients’ ability to pay. Millions of Pakistanis, for example, are subject to electricity blackouts every day due to a dispute over fees from Chinese coal-fired power stations. In Sri Lanka, another focal point of the BRI, Chinese loans triggered an infrastructure boom but also a debt overhang that arguably helped push the country into its first debt default in May and drove former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa from power. Many Sri Lankans resent what they see as China’s role in using its largesse to prop up a corrupt elite around Rajapaksa. They are demanding an end to the corruption and mismanagement that has left millions of people facing acute shortages of food, fuel and medicine. In Cambodia, while Beijing-backed loans have flowed to infrastructure like roads, bridges and power plants, a shadow stream of speculative investment from private Chinese investors has poured in and driven unsustainable development that has displaced communities. A large amount of the investment surrounded an online gambling industry that was later banned by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who acknowledged the sector’s ties to criminality. Meanwhile in China, the state banks that are lending to the BRI are increasingly troubled by bad debts. $52 billion worth of loans from Chinese institutions had to be renegotiated in 2020 and 2021. According to data collected by Rhodium Group, a New York-based economic research company, the total value of loans from Chinese institutions that had to be renegotiated in 2020 and 2021 rose by $36 billion from the previous two years, surging to $52 billion. That may be just the tip of a submerged iceberg of debt. Research published last year by AidData, an international development research lab based at the College of William & Mary in Virginia, suggested scores of BRI countries together might have $385 billion in “hidden debts” or undisclosed liabilities that governments might be obliged to pay. Chen of think tank Anbound says recipient countries are refusing to repay debt and that this is "the most worrying” challenge facing the grand undertaking. “Widespread debt evasion and avoidance would have a significant impact on China's financial stability,” he said, “and we are concerned that some countries may try to avoid paying back their debt by utilizing geopolitics and the ideological competition between East and West.” Life in a bubble Power and water shortages in Gwadar have fed local discontent. But perhaps the worst problem associated with the Chinese construction boom is, oddly, joblessness. While the CPEC aimed ambitiously to create 1.2 million jobs, the city of 90,000 has not seen many of these materialize. Indeed, much of the labor for the Chinese-led projects is imported from China. Chinese workers are forbidden from mixing with locals and restricted to a small compound, where everything is imported, and local merchants have not benefited from the new arrivals. “Chinese even bring their tissue papers from China and do not buy anything from the local markets of Gwadar,” said Adam Qadir, a local dealer of automobile oil. “The presence of [the] Chinese is not contributing to the local economy of Gwadar.” Adam Qadir, an automobile oil dealer from Gwadar The local fishing industry, which had accounted for 70% of the economy, has been devastated by Chinese trawlers fishing in the waters off Gwadar and taking their catches to Karachi. Younis Anwar Baloch, general secretary of the Gwadar Fishermen Alliance, told Nikkei Asia that a new highway has blocked the entry of fishermen into the East Bay, making it difficult for local fishermen to get their boats out. They are also prevented by security regulations from fishing near the port. As a result, eight out of 42 fish-processing factories in Gwadar have closed down, according to interviews with fishermen and Bahram Baloch, a local journalist covering economic issues. Tensions over fishing boiled over in November and December after an Islamist religious cleric organized a monthlong sit-in outside the main gate of Gwadar port. Protestors demanded an end to deep sea fish trawling, a reduction in the number of security checkpoints, that local men be allowed to fish near the port and that informal trade with Iran be restarted. The cleric’s protest completely paralyzed port activity in the town, and the government eventually accepted many of his demands. Locals mostly resent the Chinese because of what are seen as excessive security arrangements – and not just in the fishing industry. “We are made to wait for hours due to road closures for security reasons, whenever there is a high-profile visit.” A Gwadar citizen “The government had decided to fence Gwadar with barbed wire for security, and this would have separated people living in different parts of Gwadar,” a resident of Gwadar told Nikkei. Then there are the protests over water. Although the water problem has been resolved this summer, locals say the solution is temporary, with the government relying on nearby dams for water. If it rains less than expected next year, protesters will again be on the streets, locals interviewed by Nikkei say. Moreover, Baloch separatist militants (a 2017 census found the Baloch to represent 56% of the population of Balochistan) recently have mounted many attacks on Chinese interests in the region. As a consequence, Gwadar is considered insecure and thus heavily militarized. To top it off, Gwadar port is not fully functional as it still lacks basic infrastructure such as water and power, which remain at least two years away, locals say. As a result, the movement of cargo is limited. The absence of these services -- not to mention the lack of a railway connecting to the rest of the country -- limits the scope for investment. The attacks by Baloch insurgents have further discouraged investment. Pakistan’s new government under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is making a concerted effort to revive the CPEC. Mohammad Aslam Bhootani, who is one of Sharif’s principal advisers on Gwadar, said the government has controlled the security situation to a greater extent and things are moving in the right direction. “[The prime minister] has called meetings in Gwadar and reprimanded officials for the slow pace of work in Gwadar, which will change the things now,” Bhootani told Nikkei. But it might be too late. One apparent casualty is HK Sun Corp., the first Chinese company to set up shop in Gwadar. It handled recycling work at the port. According to a number of locals as well as several news reports, it has left Gwadar due to economic unviability. The Twitter account of the China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHC), denied the news that HK Sun Corp. has wound up operations in Gwadar. Jeremy Garlick, an associate professor of international relations and China studies at Prague University of Economics and Business, believes that the Chinese have realized Gwadar is not viable as a commercial port and not worth developing. “Due to lack of commercial viability and local resistance, the Chinese have been reluctant to invest as much -- or as quickly -- in Gwadar as was expected,” Garlick told Nikkei. However, Garlick says Chinese interest will continue to be driven by strategy. “[Gwadar] port may be of use to [Beijing] in the long run due to its relatively strategic position near the Strait of Hormuz,” he said. “So far the Chinese have no specific use for Gwadar, and it is not used by Chinese military vessels as far as we know.” Garlick added that in the future competition for resources could heat up, and a day might come when Gwadar will serve a purpose as a Chinese base of some kind. “This is why the Chinese are not likely to withdraw [from Gwadar],” Garlick said. Know when to fold ’em BRI projects are also struggling in Cambodia -- one of China’s key allies in Southeast Asia. The coastal city of Sihanoukville starkly highlights the woes of Chinese investment in the country. Official and illicit funds from the giant neighbor to the north have mixed destructively with Phnom Penh’s corrupt ruling elite. On the city’s outskirts sits one of three officially identified “key” Belt and Road projects: the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone. Spanning more than 11 sq. km, it houses more than 170 factories reportedly employing some 30,000 people, largely focused on textiles and apparel, luggage, leather goods, and wood products. Still under development, the joint venture is intended to accommodate up to 300 factories and between 80,000 to 100,000 workers when completed. Power is drawn from nearby China-funded coal plants, and soon another BRI project -- a $2 billion expressway -- will link the area with the capital, Phnom Penh. Sihanoukville demonstrates the extent to which money from China has transformed Cambodia during the past 15 years. China is Cambodia’s largest source of foreign direct investment, and its largest trading partner. Billions of dollars in loans from state banks have been funneled into much-needed roads, bridges, irrigation works, agricultural projects and power plants, with China-bankrolled hydro, coal and solar accounting for 66% of the energy generated in the country. Such infrastructure underpins Cambodia’s most successful industry: its $10 billion apparel and footwear export sector. Cambodia's clothing industry is dominated by Chinese-owned factories that import materials from China, assemble them, then ship finished products, mostly to Europe and the United States. It is not the manufacturing industry, however, that transformed Sihanoukville. Alongside state-backed spending, a parallel flow of loosely regulated private, often illicit, capital has boomed, leading to the uncontrolled and rapid development of areas associated with online gambling and criminal gangs who use trafficked labor to perpetrate international web-based scams. China's gambling companies brought billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of workers to what had historically been a popular seaside travel destination. The ensuing construction boom burst in 2019 when Prime Minister Hun Sen banned online gambling, pointing to the sector’s ties to scams and criminality. Hun Sen’s move was widely seen as the result of pressure from Beijing, which is actively cracking down on illicit capital outflows including those linked to gambling. To this day, more than 1,000 unfinished buildings sprawl throughout Sihanoukville, many abandoned. This collapse was compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic. Many sites in the city are now hot spots for criminal gangs running online scams, creating an environment where Chinese investors now worry about their security. Researcher Ivan Franceschini, who has studied the transformation of Sihanoukville, says the city’s development highlights the interplay between Chinese state-backed projects and private capital from Chinese investors. “The two categories are not entirely separate: First, state-backed investment in infrastructure has facilitated and encouraged the inflow of private investment; second, some private projects have subcontracted construction to Chinese state-owned companies,” said Franceschini, a postdoctoral fellow at the Australian National University. “However, while these overlaps should not be ignored, it is important not to lose perspective and subsume all Chinese investment in the city, including the shadiest gambling and scamming operations that have made headlines in the past few years, under one single agenda linked to the Chinese party-state.” White elephants Out on the Indian Ocean, the BRI has played another unwanted role. In Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country in July after demonstrators angry at a deepening economic crisis stormed his official residence. While there were bigger facets to this than the BRI, the events severely damaged the island’s image as a poster child for Chinese investment. Sri Lanka’s Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport opened to much fanfare in 2013 but has barely been used since. “The World’s Emptiest International Airport,” as it was once dubbed, has other problems: Suren Ratwatte, former chief executive officer of SriLankan Airlines, told Nikkei that the airport was built on a traditional elephant migration route. “The airport has a serious problem with elephants, wild boar, peacocks … all of which can seriously damage an aircraft.” Suren Ratwatte, former executive officer of SriLankan Airlines A financial problem also persists as Sri Lanka struggles to settle the $190 million loan from China Exim Bank for the airport. The loan forms a large chunk of the debt that the country effectively defaulted on in May. Chinese loans triggered an infrastructure boom in Sri Lanka during the final years of the South Asian nation’s nearly 30-year ethnic conflict between the government and Tamil separatist rebels. After the war ended, in May 2009, the debt from China Exim Bank loomed large. Muscular, modern buildings rose out of a remote landscape along the island’s southern coast, with thick, shrub forests where wild elephants, boar and monkeys roamed. There was little mystery to why Chinese money was transforming this rural outpost -- it was the home turf of then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had emerged as the country’s most popular politician on the back of winning the war. These projects included the new airport at Mattala and a new port at Hambantota, both of which have been added to the wider portfolio of China’s debt-funded BRI projects across Sri Lanka. Two Sri Lankan economists who have crunched the numbers estimate that Beijing’s total public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt through the China Exim Bank and China Development Bank between 2001 and 2021 to be close to $9.95 billion, with debt service repayments of $4.5 billion in the same period. BRI projects are now under increased scrutiny after Sri Lanka declared itself officially bankrupt in July. That month, the island failed for the first time to service a foreign debt, paying $78.13 million in interest for a $1.25 billion international sovereign bond. By then, the $81 billion economy was saddled with a staggering $51 billion in outstanding external debt. Sri Lankan defenders of the BRI dismiss the view of Chinese debt sinking the island’s economy as barbs leveled with geopolitical motives. “The West and India see China’s lending practices as ‘debt-trap diplomacy,’” said Maya Majueran, director of BRI Sri Lanka, an independent business consultancy. “There is no evidence to prove that China aims to deliberately push poor countries into debt.” Maya Majueran, director of consultancy BRI Sri Lanka A similar controversy once swirled around the $1.5 billion Hambantota port, built with five China Exim Bank loans over two phases. It was as empty as the Mattala Airport during its first seven years, seeing only 170 cargo ships drop anchor, despite straddling one of the busiest shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. But its economic fortunes changed by 2018, after the Sri Lankan government ditched the national port operator and offered the port on a 99-year-lease in a $1.1 billion public-private partnership deal, giving China Merchants Port Holdings an 85% stake. The China Merchants Port deal became a geopolitical lightning rod, with Western governments, led by the U.S., pointing at the port as an example of a debt-for-equity swap. Hambantota International Port has come to represent China’s “debt diplomacy.” Yet recent revelations by a Sri Lankan parliamentary committee suggest otherwise, indicating that Sri Lanka is still paying off this debt. Last year, the HIP handled 2.3 million metric tons of cargo, a 38% jump from the previous year, according to the port’s records. The weight of Chinese debt, which funded controversial BRI projects, has placed Beijing’s premier lending banks in the crosshairs. Thilina Panduwawala, head of economic research at Frontier Research, a Colombo-based consultancy said domestic political considerations have driven most of this infrastructure growth, and “the country is paying a price for (this) political rush.” Professor Zhu Jianrong, a Chinese political scholar at Tokyo's Toyo Gakuen University, rejected the notion that China went in with the intent of entrapping the country with debt, noting that it was the Sri Lankan government that first approached China for the development. He also pointed to a clause in the contract between the two nations that states that military use of the port is banned. Etsuyo Arai, director of the South Asian Studies Group at JETRO's Institute of Developing Economies, said that while Sri Lanka's large debt to China triggered the current crisis, the biggest chunk of Sri Lanka's repayment obligations were to international sovereign bonds and not to China. "Sri Lanka's woes are more about the country's economic mismanagement rather than because of China," she said. Shrinking to fit Chen of Beijing-based think tank Anbound said China has already started to be more cautious about new BRI projects. If a project is too risky, he said, China’s attitude will immediately tend to be conservative. Chen told Nikkei: “State-owned companies are mentioning less and less about financial expansion along BRI, and what they are mentioning more now is, will you get your money back for this project?” “The primary issue now is stability, not growth.” Chen Gong, founder of Beijing-based think tank Anbound Although the overall development environment around the BRI has worsened, one cannot expect the Chinese government to come out and announce it won't stay the course, Chen told Nikkei. The BRI, after all, has been a top priority for China, he noted. Whether it remains so can only be determined after the 20th Party Congress scheduled for this fall. “It is inevitable that the BRI will be adjusted,” Chen said. “And it may shrink from a strategic vision of economic cooperation across land and sea to a regional multilateral cooperation initiative, or completely abandoned on a gradual basis -- again depending on the top leader's will.”

Hooray finally Taiwan will be liberated from the imperialists! Go CCP go! https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-02/china-announces-military-drills-encircling-taiwan-from-aug-4-7-l6cc5ljn China Plans Four Days of Military Drills in Areas Encircling Taiwan - Beijing declares provocative show of force after Pelosi lands - Taiwan’s ruling party calls on China to be ‘responsible power’ By Sarah Zheng, 2 August 2022 at 22:29 GMT+7Updated on3 August 2022 at 00:12 GMT+7 China will conduct large-scale military drills and missile tests around Taiwan in a defiant show of force after House speaker Nancy Pelosi became the highest-ranking US politician to land on the island in a quarter century. Beijing announced six exclusion zones encircling Taiwan to facilitate live-fire military drills from Thursday to Sunday, with some of the areas crossing into the island’s territorial waters. The size and scope of the areas could set the stage for the Chinese military’s most provocative actions near Taiwan in decades. An aircraft carrying US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi arrives in Taipei, Aug. 2. Photographer: Lam Yik Fei/Bloomberg Separately, the People’s Liberation Army said exercises could start as soon as Tuesday, leaving open the possibility of military activities around Taiwan while Pelosi was visiting. The operations include “long-range live firing in the Taiwan Strait” and “regular-guided fire testing in the eastern waters” off Taiwan from Tuesday evening, the PLA said. “This action is targeted at the US’s shocking recent major escalation on the Taiwan issue, and serves as a serious warning to Taiwanese independence forces or those seeking independence,” Shi Yi, a spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command, said in a statement. A map released by the Xinhua news agency in China details areas that will be used for military drills encircling Taiwan from Aug. 4-7. Source: Xinhua. During the military drills, “relevant ships and aircraft should not enter the above sea areas and airspaces during this period,” the official Xinhua News Agency said in a report late Tuesday, which gave coordinates for the exercises. The exercises highlight the risk that Taiwan tensions could exacerbate existing supply chain woes. The Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships passing from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to points west. Almost half of the global container fleet and 88% of the world’s largest ships by tonnage passed through the waterway this year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Taiwan’s defense ministry said 21 Chinese military aircraft entered its air-defense identification zone Tuesday, compared to four the day before. The PLA has stepped up its flights near Taiwan in recent months, and ramps ups the show of force around key events, including visits by US poltiicians. Pelosi became the first US House speaker to visit the island in 25 years when her military aircraft arrived at Songshan Airport shortly before 11 p.m. local time. China considers Taiwan part of its territory and protests diplomatic visits to the democratic island. The planned drills would be the most serious show of force by China around Taiwan since at least 1995, when Beijing test-fired missiles into the sea near the island. That move was part of China’s protests against President Bill Clinton’s decision to let Taiwan’s first democratically elected president, Lee Teng-hui, visit the US. Back then, China also declared exclusion zones around target areas during the tests, disrupting shipping and air traffic. Pelosi plans to hold a joint press briefing with President Tsai Ing-wen at about 10:50 a.m. Wednesday, the Taiwan leader’s office said in a statement. She is expected to depart the island later that day to continue her Asia tour visiting US allies South Korea and Japan. Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party called on China to exercise restraint and stop acts of military and political intimidation. China should “demonstrate the demeanor of a responsible power,” DPP spokeswoman Hsieh Pei-fen said in a statement late Tuesday. “No threatening remarks or provocative actions can reduce even slightly the determination of Taiwan and its international friends to defend democracy and freedom,” she added.